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RECENT DECISIONS 
ADMIRALTY-SHIPOWNER'S RIGHT To INDEMNIFICATION FOR Loss 
CAUSED BY LATENTLY DEFECTIVE GEAR SUPPLIED BY NoNNEGLIGENT STEVEDOR-
ING -COMPANY-Defendant stevedoring company contracted to perform 
stevedoring services for plaintiff shipowner. Pursuant to its agreement to 
supply gear for the job, the stevedoring company supplied a latently 
defe<;tive rope, the breaking of which caused injury to a longshoreman, an 
employee of the stevedoring company. The longshoreman obtained a judg-
menf against the shipowner under the doctrine of unseaworthiness, and in 
a separate action th_e shipowner sought indemnification £:rom the stevedor-
ing company. The district court, finding the stevedoring company not 
negligent, denied recovery.1 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirnied, one judge dissenting.2 On certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court, held, reversed and remanded, three Justices dissenting. A stevedor-
ing C!)Illpany, even though not negligent, breaches its implied warranty of 
worlqnanlike service when it supplies latently defective gear. Italia Societa 
per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 84 Sup. Ct. 748 (1964).8 
Ii is well settled in maritime law that a shipowner is absolutely liable to 
seamen for injuries resulting from the unseaworthiness of the vessel,4 
including unseaworthiness attributable to defective gear brought aboard by 
a stevedoring company.5 This unique doctrine is the result of long-standing 
judicial solicitude for seamen,6 and it has been extended to cover long-
shoremen and other workmen when they perform duties traditionally done 
by members of the ship's crew.7 This judicial concern for seamen's welfare 
was the determinative factor in the principal case. The objective of the 
Court was to reduce the hazards encountered by seamen,8 and it therefore 
1 The district court's opinion is unreported. 
2 Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 310 F.2d 481 
(9th Cir. 1962). 
8 The stevedoring company had agreed in its contract with appellant to be liable for 
negligence. The district court held that this express assumption of negligence liability 
negated any liability for nonnegligent conduct which might arise under the implied 
warranty of workmanlike service. Since the court of appeals found that the warranty did 
not extend to nonnegligent conduct, it was unnecessary for it to pass upon the effect of the 
contractual liability provision. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of 
appeals to decide the effect of the contractual liability provision, for that issue became 
pertinent in light of the Supreme Court's decision. Principal case at 754. 
4 Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). For a thorough judicial analysis 
of the unseaworthiness doctrine, see Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960). 
See generally GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY §§ 6-38 to -44 (1957). 
5 Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954) (shipowner's right to indemnification 
not involved). 
6 See Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1944); White, A New Look at 
the Shipowner's Right-Over for Shipboard Injuries, 12 STAN. L. REv. 717 (1960). 
7 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). 
s Principal case at 754. The Court also implied that another objective furthered by 
its decision was "to compensate seamen for the_ accidents that inevitably occur." Ibid. 
However, the seaman (longshoreman) had already recovered, and resolution of the issue 
of indemnity between shipowner and stevedoring company should have no bearing on the 
·seam~•s right to receive compensation from either. 
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rested its decision principally on the ground that "liability· should fall 
upon the party best situated to adopt preventive measures and thereby to 
reduce the likelihood of injury."9 In the principal case that party was the 
stevedoring company. The leading case in the area is Ryan Stevedoring 
Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.,10 the case in which the Supreme Court first 
recognized the existence of an implied warranty of workmanlike service in 
maritime contracts. Although in that case the Court's opinion was ambigu-
ous as to the scope of the warranty,11 the stevedoring company had in fact 
been negligent, and the case therefore decided no more than that negligent 
conduct breached the warranty. The principal case is a clear extension of 
Ry(ln into the area of liability without fault. 
The precise question in the principal case-whether a nonnegligent 
stevedoring company is liable for idemnification when its gear causes 
injury-has arisen only once before, in Booth S.S. Co. v. Meier & Oelhaj 
Co.12 In that case the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit regarded the 
company as a bailor of chattels for hire and applied bailment law. This 
approach is logically appealing. Under its contract, a stevedoring company 
is obligated to supply gear,13 and thus at least a part of the contract fee is 
arguably given solely for this promise to supply gear. Indeed, if the stevedor-
ing company refused to supply gear, the shipowner would have to lease 
it from an independent supplier, and that clearly would be: a bailment for 
hire. In allowing indemnity the court in the Booth case cited no case law 
on point, but agreed with the position taken by leading text-writers14 that 
the strict liability warranties of the law of sales should extend to the law 
of bailments. However, this position flies in the face of the overwhelming 
weight of authority, which holds that while a bailor of chattels for hire im-
pliedly warrants that they are fit for their intended purpose, this warranty 
imposes only an obligation to use ordinary and reasonable care to discover 
defects.111 In the principal case the Court specifically declined to adopt the 
9 Ibid. 
10 350 U.S. 124 (1956) (five-to-four decision). In this case the Court allowed a ship-
owner, from whom an injured longshoreman had recovered, to recover indemnity from 
the stevedoring company whose negligence had caused the injury. 
11 See notes 26-28 infra and accompanying text. 
12 262 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1958). This case involved a vessel repair company rather than 
a stevedoring company, but the fact situation and sole issue were essentially identical to 
those of the principal case. 
13 In the principal case there was an express contract provision whereby the stevedoring 
company agreed to supply the gear necessary to do the job. Principal case at 749. Although 
it is hot clear, apparently a similar promise was made in the Booth case. Booth S.S. Co. 
v. Meier &: Oelhaf Co., supra note 12. 
14 Sec 2 HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS § 28.19, at 1576-77 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS § 83, at 496 
(2d ed. 1955); 4 WILLISTON, CoNTRACI'S § 1041, at 2907 (rev. ed. 1936). 
111 See 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 25(a) (1962) and cases cited therein; Annot., 131 A.L.R. 845 
(1941) and cases cited therein. Only one case has been found which flatly stated that a 
bailor of chattels is liable for latent defects regardless of the degree of care exercised. 
Eastern Motors Express, Inc. v. A. Maschmeijer, Jr., Inc., 247 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1957). 
However, that case had a number of distinguishing features which would take it out of 
the ordinary bailment situation; and the court cited no authority in point. A- close 
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bailment approach, and carefully limited its decision to maritime contracts 
which are governed by the federal law of admiralty, "an area where rather 
special rules governing the obligations and liability of shipowners prevail."16 
The Court noted, however, that the considerations which motivated its 
decision were the same as those which "underlie a manufacturer's or 
seller's obligation to supply products free of defects"17-namely, that im-
position of strict liability would force the supplier of chattels to take 
preventive measures above and beyond the duty of due care, thereby ulti-
mately reducing the number of injuries caused by defective chattels.18 The 
Court had in mind two specific preventive measures which it felt its 
decision would compel stevedoring companies to take in the future: testing 
of the equipment and establishment of retirement schedules for equip-
ment.19 Although imposition of strict liability may effectively increase 
safety testing in the manufacturing industry, it must be remembered that a 
manufacturer will have to conduct these tests only once. In the stevedoring 
industry it would be impossible to know exactly what stresses and strains 
the equipment had been subjected to, and thus impossible to detect latent 
defects which had developed, unless extensive tests were conducted after 
every stevedoring job. Thus the burden on a manufacturer to conduct more 
tests than due care requires-a burden imposed with reluctance by the 
courts-would be greatly compounded if imposed on a stevedoring com-
pany.20 As a practical matter, extensive testing after each use would 
probably be economically infeasible, and the stevedoring company would 
most likely choose either to run the risk of occasional nonnegligent injuries, 
insure against them, or insist on the insertion of a contractual disclaimer of 
liability for other than negligence losses.21 In any case, the Court's objective 
reading of other cases which have occasionally been cited as imposing strict liability in 
bailments (see Note, 2 VAND. L. REv. 675, 677-79 (1949); 17 MINN. L. REv. 210 (1933)) 
reveals that they either were instances of actual negligence or else they involved a first 
leasing of a machine specifically manufactured for the bailee (e.g., Hartford Battery Sales 
Corp. v. Price, 119 Pa. Super. 165, 181 Atl. 95 (1935)). Also, a bailment for hire would seem 
to be analogous to a sale of second-hand goods-a situation in which no strict liability 
is imposed. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, comments 3, 4; I WILLISTON, SALES 
§ 232, at 594 (rev. ed. 1948). 
10 Principal case at 754. 
17 Principal case at 753. 
18 Aside from prevention, there are two other considerations which often underlie the 
imposition of strict liability on a manufacturer or seller: (1) inequality of bargaining 
position, and (2) distribution of the loss throughout the enterprise. However, since the 
principal case involved two commercial enterprises of relatively equal bargaining power, 
both of which were equally able to distribute the loss by raising prices or acquiring 
insurance, these considerations could have no bearing on the outcome of the case. 
19 Principal case at 753. 
20 This is probably one of the main reasons why the courts have refused to impose 
strict liability on bailors of chattels for hire. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. 
21 Although there is considerable doubt as to the validity of disclaimers of negligence 
liability, disclaimers of strict liability warranties have been universally upheld except 
where there has been a gross inequality of bargaining position. There was no such 
inequality in the principal case. See 109 U. PA. L. REv. 453, 455-58 (1961). 
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of preventing injuries through judicially-coerced testing will be defeated. 
The other objective-establishment of retirement schedules-could prob-
ably be accomplished as effectively under a negligence standard as under 
one imposing strict liability, for omission of adequate retirement schedules 
could justifiably be regarded as negligence.22 The Court's sole reason for 
its decision-prevention of injuries-seems to be a somewhat tenuous 
justification for shifting the onerous burden of strict liability for unsea-
worthiness from one innocent party to another. 
A further ramification of ruling in favor of indemnification evoked 
dissent not only in the principal case, but also in the earlier Ryan case. In 
neither case was there an express indemnity agreement covering the type of 
loss involved. The sole objection of the four dissenters in Ryan was that to 
allow indemnity amounted to judicial circumvention of the congressional 
mandate embodied in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Com-
pensation Act that a longshoreman's recovery of a statutory compensation 
award is to be his "exclusive remedy" against his employer.23 The act does 
not preclude a longshoreman from suing a third party,24 but when his 
employer must indemnify the third party for a large jury verdict, the 
longshoreman is in essence recovering from his employer an amount in 
excess of the statutory limit.25 While all nine Justices agreed in Ryan that 
the statutory purpose would not be circumvented if indemnity were based 
on "contract," the four dissenters insisted that it must be an express agree-
ment, whereas the majority felt that recovery on an implied warranty would 
constitute recovery on the "contract." Unfortunately, the majority was 
ambiguous as to just what kind of an implied warranty it was dealing with. 
The Court stated that the implied warranty of workmanlike service is a 
"purely consensual obligation"26 and not "implied in law,"27 but a few 
sentences later the Court said that the warranty is "comparable to a 
manufacturer's warranty of the soundness of its manufactured product."28 
The ordinary manufacturer's implied warranty is, of course, implied in law 
and exists regardless of the intent of the parties.29 Nevertheless, Ryan 
involved negligence; and since it is a fair inference that a service contractor 
22 At present, the omission of such retirement schedules apparently does not amount 
to negligence, and the stevedoring company can avoid liability for such omission by means 
of a disclaimer. If such an omission were deemed to constitute negligence, however, the 
company could probably not escape liability with a disclaimer. See note 21 supra. 
23 Section 905, 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1958). 
24 Section 933, 44 Stat. 1440 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 933(a), (b) (Supp. IV, 1963). 
25 For a criticism of Ryan's so-called "circumstances" of the statute, see Comment, 6 
N.Y.L.F. 168 (1960). This chance interaction of the seaworthiness doctrine with the 
Compensation Act creates a highly unusual and complicated situation as far as indemnity 
liabilities are concerned. See Stover, Longshoreman-Shipowner-Stevedore: The Circle of 
Liability, 61 MICH. L. REv. 539 (1963); White, supra note 6, at 729-30. 
26 Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 131-32 (1956). 
27 Id. at 133. 
28 Id. at 133-34. 
20 See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 14, § 83 at 494; 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 991, at 
2730-32 (rev. ed. 1936). 
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impliedly agrees in fact to be liable for his own negligence, that case could 
be rt;ad as merely holding that the statute was not circumvented because the 
Court was simply holding the contractor to what he had agreed to in fact. 
Although the majority in the principal case considered the statutory circum-
vention issue to have been fully settled in Ryan,80 its decision actually 
extends Ryan by making it clear that allowing indemnity will not circum-
vent: the statute even where the employer has not expressly or impliedly 
agreed in fact to be liable. It was this extension to which the dissenters in 
the principal case objected.81 The majority's position is consistent with the 
weight of authority under state compensation statutes with similar "ex-
clusive remedy" provisions.82 Nevertheless, it would seem that the statute 
is indeed being circumvented. As pointed out above, the Court's objective 
was prevention of injury. The injury was caused solely by the employer. 
As far as prevention of injuries caused solely by the employer is concerned, 
it would appear that Congress has already made a policy decision that 
stri.ct liability with maximum recovery limitations is the most efficient and 
equitable solution to the problem. 
The decision in the principal case could have far-reaching effects, even 
in the area of maritime law to which it was confined. Although the 
warranty involved was associated with a service contract, the liability arose 
'from the supplying of a defective chattel. There appears to be no obstacle 
to extending such strict liability to anyone who supplies chattels to a 
shipowner, whether by bailment or sale.33 Indeed, the Court in Ryan, in 
speaking of liability under the warranty, stated that "a like result occurs 
where a shipowner sues, for breach of warranty, a supplier of defective ship's 
gear that has caused injury or death to a longshoreman using it in the 
course of his employment on shipboard."34 And even though the decision 
in the principal c.ase was confined to maritime law, it will undoubtedly have 
80 The majority mentioned this issue only in a footnote. Principal case at 752, n.6. 
81 Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas dissented in the principal 
case. Mr. Justice Clark, who had joined them in the Ryan dissent, was in the majority. 
Aside from the statutory circumvention issue, the dissenters in the principal case also felt 
that the decision was an unwarranted expansion of the general law of warranty which 
"will cause us regret in future cases in other areas of the law as well as in admiralty." 
Principal case at 755. 
32 See 2 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 76.00 (1961). 
33 Of course the bailment or sale contract would have to be a "maritime contract" in 
order for the maritime law of the principal case to be applicable. Such contracts have in 
the past been held to be maritime contracts and probably will continue to be so held 
in the future. See Cunningham, Warranties Go to Sea, 15 SYRACUSE L. REv. 19, 21-25 
.(1963). 
34 Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 130 (1956). Note also 
the following language in Booth S.S. Co. v. Meier & Oelhaf Co., 262 F.2d 310, 314 (2d Cir. 
1958): 
"In Shamrock Towing Co. v. Fitcher Steel Corp., 2 Cir., 1946, 155 F.2d 69, we stated 
in dictum that the warranty of a supplier of marine equipment was as absolute as the 
maritime warranty of seaworthiness, ••• that it therefore made no difference whether 
a defect was discoverable; that as a result both warranties would be breached in the 
• event.that the chattel supplied proved inadequate to the purpose for which it was 
supplied under normal conditions of use. We see no reason to alter that opinion." 
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an influence on the development of both general warranty law and the law 
of workmen's compensation. 
John W. ETickson 
